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It is commonly known that the terrorism 
issue has become one of the contemporary 
security challenges a state and its strategic 
planners should encounter. In most cases, 
strategic planners’ focus is to identify a 
group of terrorism doctrine and motivation. 
The roots of it can be classified at least by 
the feeling of injustice, mental illness, 
radicalization, or misleading ideologies. In 
literature, there have been a lot of authors 
in terrorism books that provide brilliant 
arguments explaining the existence of 
terrorism. Amid such numerous books on 
the subject, nevertheless, it seems like there 
is a missing link as authors rarely discuss 
comprehensive explanations regarding how 
the terrorist is armed. This question is 
essential since terrorism cannot do such 
attacks if they do not possess the means to 
do that. Audrey Kurth Cronin’s book 
attempted to fill this gap by providing in-
depth historical studies and drawing 
potentially complicated situations as states 
cannot seal the weaponization process of 
the terrorist group.   
Cronin's thesis is to state that in an era in 
which a new breed of technologies is 
continuously appearing in a fast time, 
 




technologies usages possess a critical point 
to become new potential dangers as terrorist 
organizations are likely to utilize them for 
violent purposes, wreak havoc and 
destabilize state security. Therefore, states 
should master this issue and formulate an 
effective asymmetric warfare strategy to 
minimize security vulnerabilities from any 
kind of irresponsible use of disruptive 
technologies by terrorist organizations. 
In general, this book consists of three 
parts within which Cronin set for 
theoretical frameworks for the book in part 
1; followed by the history of technological 
innovation in weapons which is misused by 
the terrorist group in part 2; and in the final 
part, it discusses the latest developments of 
technological innovations, and how 
terrorist groups take advantages from the 
current inadequate policy. 
In part 1, Cronin elaborates the works of 
prominent scholars to explain the 
relationship between war and technology 
and how states are secured from the source 
of threat. Cronin begins with Max Weber's 
theory regarding states' monopoly use of 
force. According to this theory, states 
would increase sophisticated lethal 
technology capabilities to affect war and 
confer power because it is believed that 
states’ military innovation superiority 
determines the result of war.  
For instance, during the Matabele War in 
1893, using Maxim Guns, a 700-man of UK 
force wiped out 1500 Matabele King 
warriors. Another example is manifested by 
the Battle of Midway 1942 between the 
Japanese Navy against the United States 
and its allies. Because of the excellence of 
the American cryptography system, the US 
won the battle although at that time the 
Japanese Navy had more deployed forces. 
Japan lost four carriers and two cruisers 
meanwhile the United States lost a carrier 
and a destroyer with a casualty ratio of 
about 10:1. The invention of nuclear has 
further developed another strategy to secure 
from direct military attack as it has a 
credible deterrence effect. However, as the 
adversaries are to include non-state actors, 
all of the possession of innovative military 
technology cannot automatically assure the  
security of states.  
The world now is entering the fourth 
wave of violation characterized by the 
rising of religious fundamentalism 
influence. Islamic States, Al-Qaeda, Shiite 
Hezbollah, Jewish Kahane Kai, Japan’s 
Aum Shinrikyo among others represent the 
violent groups during this wave. 
Previously, the world has recognized the 
trend of anarchism, 
ethnonationalism/separatism violence, and 
Marxism ideology-based movement. 
Through those four waves, it is understood 
that terrorism tactics can be made through 
bombings, hit and run attacks with small 
arms such as AK47 assault rifles, hijacking 
or kidnapping, to suicidal attacks through 
lethal explosive weapons. The new digital 
tools of the internet help groups attract new 
followers and mobilize them.  
Cronin also argues that terrorist groups 
in their development can innovate 
everything to be their source of weapons. 
She explains it extensively in part 2. 
Starting from Narodnaya Volya that 
assassinated Tsar Alexander II through the 
misuse, accessible, and cheap dynamite 
whose primary purpose was designed for 
construction and mining at that time. And 
then, for another case, the Irish rebellion 
movement against the UK government. 
Helped and funded by the Irish who were 
exiled to the US, they learned how to build 
an explosive bomb themselves. Moreover, 
they could innovate their signature by 
combining an explosive, a detonator, and a 
time delay unit. 
Among other things, the AK47 has also 
become another trademark in terrorist 
organizations. In this part, Cronin 
explained it extensively from Soviet use to 
the current dispersed use that armament 
factories to produce the AK47 can be found 
in many states, such as Ukraine, India, 
China, Nigeria, Iraq, and many more. Some 
vendors make illegal deals with terrorist 
organizations. 
In the final part, Cronin explains the role  
 




of current technological development to 
support terrorist organizations. There are 
numerous intriguing and important data 
here to understand how the terrorist is 
armed in the internet era and why some 
policy of states is ineffective. In this part, 
she first argues that terror attacks can be 
inspired by the spread of hate speech 
through multiple media, be it magazine, or 
online-based. Anwar Awlaki can be the 
best example of why someone wants to be 
a terrorist and arm him/herself. 
Despite having passed away, his hate 
speech could still be watched on YouTube 
or Facebook. the US government blocked 
internet content regarding Awlaki, but his 
follower could still find it. Even he gained 
more influence after his death. Several 
terror attacks in the US, Singapore, 
Bangladesh, and the UK from 2013-2016 
exposed evidence that there are linkages 
between attackers and Awlaki teachings. 
Simply put, the internet has facilitated 
terrorist mobilization to do such violent 
acts. Agitators connected to the internet use 
this kind of teachings to increase the means 
of mobilization besides the spread of offline 
pamphlets, books, newspapers, and many 
more.  
To reinforce her argument that the 
internet matters in arming and part of 
psychological tactics of terrorist, Cronin 
point out terrorist organization in the 
Middle East. She notes that IS (Islamic 
State) has utilized Twitter as its marketing 
campaign in 2014. In Iraq, this campaign 
was considered effective in toppling down 
the Iraqi Government and society through 
the spread of violent photos and videos of 
executed Iraqi soldiers posted on Instagram 
and Twitter. Many Iraqi soldiers took off 
their uniforms, dropped their weapons, and 
joined the civilians leaving the region. 
Other terrorist organizations have also 
utilized the same strategy on the internet, 
such as Al-Shabaab, Al-Qaeda, and Boko 
Haram. Besides spreading hatred, 
manipulating targets on their narratives, 
and creating fake accounts on social media 
to assist their agenda, terrorist 
organizations simulate the creation of 
bombs with dozens of different language 
instructions. Some tried to erase them, but 
the internet always provides terrorists with 
alternative ways. Therefore, it is true as 
Cronin argues that this dark side dimension 
of internet connectivity should therefore be 
anticipated by governments to prevent 
further mobilization and radicalization on 
the internet. 
The book also notes that in the Middle 
East, religious fundamentalism-based 
terrorist organizations are considered to be 
the more extreme version and possess more 
advanced technologies than those outside 
the region. Here, they have operated 
weaponized drones (UAV/Unmanned 
Aerial Vehicle). Iran is considered to 
become a state provider that gave this 
technology to several organizations, such as 
Hamas, Hezbollah, and Houthi rebels until 
the internal component of these 
organizations could independently build 
their drones to attack their political 
opponent. 
Drones are considered impactful not 
only for attacking but also for surveillance 
purposes. Cronin provides another 
important piece of data regarding the 
United States' experience in operating 
drones to track terrorist presence. From 
Cronin's point of view, the use of drones 
provided other issues in the United States' 
war on terrorism. The drone market is now 
dominated by China-based company, Da-
Jiang Innovations (DJI) and the U.S. army 
operated it due to its impressive yet 
inexpensive. The issue is that every time a 
DJI system is launched, it sends a pingback 
to the manufacturer. Therefore, whenever 
the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) or 
the U.S. Army, or various other actors use 
these off-the-shelf systems, data about their 
activities is captured and aggregated in 
DJI's massive commercial database. By 
2017, sensing the dangerous effect from the 
DJI, Lt. Gen. Joseph H. Anderson, U.S. 
Army deputy chief of staff ordered to 
terminate this kind of drone. 
Cronin also depicts that the popularity of  
 




drones also occurs in IS and some separatist 
and proxy groups in Ukraine. IS militia 
experiment has been successfully 
developed weaponized drones and 
commercialized them. In a month by 2017, 
IS could launch the aerial attack from 
drones from 60 to 10 times in Iraq and 
Syria, intimidate and kill society. Iraqi 
force operation later had also confirmed 
that they found IS headquarter dedicated to 
transforming commercial drones such as 
China DJI Phantom into the weaponized 
drone. 
The drone is used also in a proxy war 
between Ukraine-Russia. Russian forces 
routinely dropped bombs from the UAV. 
Here, another instrument of arming 
terrorism is highlighted by Cronin. She 
argues that the source of armed terrorists 
can also be based on crowdfunding. In the 
Ukraine conflict, for instance, some 
Ukrainian diaspora jointly provided cash to 
finance the purchase of drones. The reason 
why drone was chosen is that, again, it is 
cheap, cheaper than having to buy fighter 
jets or missiles. The drone is also 
modifiable and easy to be armed with. 
In the last chapter, Cronin reminds us 
that the possession of artificial intelligence 
(AI) can also be the source of terror. AI may 
be expensive in its development, a terrorist 
organization may also not afford it. 
However, as stated above, there is a 
possibility that the organization is used as a 
proxy by certain states. There is a 
possibility that they will provide certain 
technologies for terrorist organizations. 
When AI gains popularity in conflict, the 
outcome of conflict may be hard to predict. 
Some AI can also be used as an information 
manipulator that can also threaten stability. 
We also have to be concerned with AI, 
because the use of robots may displace 
human works. If policymakers cannot find 
effective solutions, there must be greater 






To conclude, I think this book has 
delivered so depth and extensive 
understanding of terrorist attack history 
with its relations to the technological 
adaptation. By reading this book, decision-
makers and strategic planners can prepare a 
more concrete policy to encounter terrorist 
and separatist attacks. 
However, the book left me incomplete 
and gave some other thoughts. While many 
elements of Cronin states had occurred in 
Indonesia, such as bombing methods, 
crowdfunding, self-radicalization through 
the internet, or illegal arms sales, there is 
one critical element that remains to be 
explained. In this regard, it is about why 
drones have not been utilized as terrorist 
and separatist group instruments of attack 
in Indonesia? This puzzle might be one 
critical point on Cronin's theory of 
technological adaptive terrorists. As we 
know, a drone can be bought easily for the 
past few years. I do not expect that terrorists 
utilize it here in Indonesia anyway. 
Nevertheless, at least since the Bali 
bombings two decades ago, there have been 
no significant changes in terrorist and 
separatist attack patterns. Drones are not 
used although drones can become the next 
differentiator.   
More importantly, this puzzle happened 
in a time of the abundance of information 
on the internet. Theoretically speaking, 
there must be easier for them to learn and 
assemble armed drones but they do not 
strategically utilize this idea, leading to 
another cynical question of whether they 
are truly adaptive to the invention of 
technologies. Therefore, further 
investigation into this puzzle might be 
important. The next research agenda to 
explain the causality of this puzzle might be 
important for the strategic studies literature 
or terrorism studies in particular. 
